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Assignments of Accounts Receivable
as Preferences in Bankruptcy
I
INTRODUCTION
In connection with the so-called Chandler Act Amendments of 1938
in bankruptcy, the section defining a preference was the subject of sub-
stantial change.1 The effect has been to place the law in doubt and con-
fusion.
The matter is particularly important to a bang since its practice
of lending on accounts receivable may have been transformed, in some
jurisdictions, from what was formerly a fairly well secured loan to a
somewhat capricious one to be protected only by higher interest rates and
carrying charges in order that the losses of one account may be made up
by the profits on others. This follows out of the wording of Section 60
that a preference is a transfer of any of the property of a debtor to or
for the benefit of a creditor for or on account of an antecedent debt
made or suffered by the debtor while insolvent and within four months
before the filing by or against him of the petition in bankruptcy, and
especially out of the wording that a transfer shall be deemed to have
been made at the time when it became so far perfected that no bona
fide purchaser from the debtor and no creditor could thereafter have
acquired any right in the property so transferred superior to the right
of the transferee therein, further, that if such transfer is not so perfected
prior to the filing of the petition in bankruptcy, it shall be deemed to
have been made immediately before bankruptcy. 2 In other words, there
is risk, depending in some measure on applicable state law, of the lend-
ing bank finding what it thought to be a valid security invalidated as a
preference at the suit of a subsequently appointed bankruptcy trustee of
the borrower with the result that the lender shares in the liquidation of
its debtor only along with the general unsecured creditors.3
Whether the loan was "perfected" within four months of the bank-
ruptcy petition, or outside the magic four months period preceding bank-
152 STAT. 869, 870 (1938), 11 U.S.C.A. 496 (a) and (b).
252 STAT. 869 (1938), 11 U.S.C.A. .96 (a).
352 STAT. 870 (1938), 11 U.S.C.A. 496 (b).
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ruptcy becomes the ultimate question and this depends primarily on
whether the pledgee's position is secure as against bona fide purchasers
or creditors under the applicable state law. The assignment may have
been made outside the four months period; it will still be vulnerable to
attack if perfected within four months of the bankruptcy petition.
There are three rules. Some American jurisdictions apply the Eng-
lish rule which found interpretation in the leading case of Dearle v. Hall,
decided in 1828.4 The English court reasoned that there can be no de-
livery of a chose in action, and that in lieu thereof, the assignee must
give notice to the debtor of the assignment to him, and that if a second
assignee notifies the debtor first, the second assignee is preferred to the
first assignee.
Section 60 of the Chandler Act states in effect that a transfer
of an interest is not complete until neither a subsequent creditor nor a
subsequent bona fide purchaser can acquire a better right than the right
of the original assignee. So, applying the English rule, as it exists in
many of our states today, to our present bankruptcy law, we find that
a bank, to make a loan on accounts receivable of a local business house,
would have to notify each of the account debtors to protect itself from
a subsequent claimant's giving notice and gaining priority.
During the course of the nineteenth century, various American state
courts developed a rule of their own, the so-called American rule, in
respect to the assignment of accounts. It was originally a minority rule
adhered to by only seven states-Kentucky, Massachusetts, Minnesota,
New York, Oregon, Texas and West Virginia.5 However, in 1924,
Salem Trust Co. v. Manufacturers Finance Company was decided by the
Supreme Court of the United States, changing the rule of the federal
courts from the English rule to the American rule.6 The court made two
rulings as to assignments of accounts receivable:
1. "There is no decision of this court which sustains the contention
that as between successive assignees of the same chose in action,
mere priority of notice gives priority of right. It seems to us that
the better reasons are against such a rule. By the first assignment,
the rights of the assignor pass to the assignee. The creditor has
a right to dispose of.his own property as he chooses, and to require
the debt to be paid as he directs, without the assent of the debtor."
4 Appeal in Dearie v.. Hall (1827), 3 Russ. 47, 38 English Reports (Chan-
cery) 492.6 Annototion 31 A.L.R. 879 (1924); 110 A.L.R. 774 (1937).6Salem Trust Co. v. Mfrs. Finance Co. (C.C.A. Mass. 1924) 280 F. 803,
260 U. S. 714, 43 S. Ct, 89, 67 L. Ed. 477; rev 264 U. S. 182, 44
S. Ct. 266, 68 L. Ed. 628, 31 A.L.R. 867.
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2. "We hold that mere priority of notice to the debtor by a second
assignee, who lent his money to the assignor without making any
inquiry of the debtor, is not sufficient to subordinate the first
assignment to the second."
This was the beginning of the trend away from the English rule, and
the result is that today the English rule is the minority rule in the United
States.7
Unfortunately, the question arose under the American rule as to
what would happen if the debtor paid the second assignee instead of the
first assignee. To be sure, the debtor would be protected by such pay.
ment in good faith, but a split of authority developed over the right to
the proceeds of payment. The Massachusetts rule developed that if the
debtor paid the second assignee, the second assignee could keep the pay-
ment.8 This is the rule of Section 173 (b) (i) of the Restatement of
Contracts.9 The New York rule, on the other hand, as developed in
the New York courts, was to the effect that, even though the debtor
paid the second assignee in good faith, the first assignee had a good
cause of action against the second assignee to recover the amount. 10
Applying these two rules, could a bank safely loan money on ac-
counts receivable? Under the Massachusetts rule, it could not. Under
such a rule, a second assignee could, under the provision of Section 60,
cut off the interest of the first assignee; but, under the New York rule,
the bank could make a safe loan because, even though a second assignee
were to intervene and be paid by the debtor, the first assignee would have
a good cause of action against the second assignee to recover the pay-
ment the second assignee had received on the account.
Until 1938, there was a feeling that the federal courts were not
obliged to follow state law as to the validity of assignments of accounts
receivable, since this was held to be "general law," but in that year Judge
Story's one hundred year old decision in Swift v. Tyson was reversed by
Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, which held that the federal courts must follow
the applicable state law in the state in which the court was sitting.1 1 The
TREPORT OF SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON UNIFORM ACT ON ASSIGNMENT
OF ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLE BY NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COM-
MISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS (1944), p. 5; Koessler,
Assignments of Accounts Receivable 33 CALIF. L. REV. 40 (1945).
BRabinowitz v. People's National Bank (1920) 235 Mass. 102, 126
N.E. 289,
9RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS, 4173.
1OSuperior Brassier Co. v. Zimetbaum (1925) 214 App. Div. 525, 212
N. Y. Supp. 473.
IlErie R. Co. v. Tompkins (1938) 304 U. S. 64, 82 L. Ed. 1188, 58 S. Ct.
817, 114 A.L.R. 1487.
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effect of this decision on Section 60 is to place within the jurisdiction
of the forty-eight states the power to determine whether there has been
a completed transfer so that no subsequent interested party can establish
a valid prior claim to the assigned property.
II
DECISIONS UNDER SECTION SIXTY OF THE
CHANDLER ACT AMENDMENT IN BANKRUPTCY
Leading decisions since the Chandler Act Amendment of 1938
follow. The most important case appealed to the U. S. Supreme Court
was decided in 1943, Corn Exchange National Bank v. Klauder.12 The
trustee in bankruptcy was allowed to recover an assignment because of
the Pennsylvania law which, following the English rule, allowed a second
assignee, by prior notification of the debtor, to gain priority over the
first assignee, because, as the court interpreted Section 60, it meant as
we saw in the English case of Dearie v. Hall, that assignments are in-
tangible choses in action and, since they can not be delivered in the ordi-
nary sense, they can best be reduced to possession by notification to the
debtor, and the first assignee to do so completes the transfer in his favor.
Thereafter, the Vardaman Shoe Company case was decided in the
Missouri Federal District Court in 1943.13 The court held that even
where state law did not require an assignee of accounts to give notice
thereof so as to defeat a subsequent good faith assignee, if such a subse-
quent assignee could improve his position by acts such as payment or
satisfaction of the obligor's duty, or the obtaining of a judgment against
the obligor, or the securing of a new contract by means of novation, or
the delviery of a tangible token or writing, surrender of which is required
by the obligor's contract for its enforcement, then the transfer of an
assignment was not "perfected" within the meaning of Section 60 since
the trustee is put in the shoes of a hypothetical subsequent assignee by
that section. Thus, we have the Massachusetts rule and the so-called "four
horsemen" of the Contracts Restatement. 14
However, In re Rosen et al., a New Jersey case decided in 1946,
the court found that the assignment of book accounts was bona fide and
fully consummated when executed, since in New Jersey an assignment
of accounts is valid without notice and a subsequent bona fide assignee
12(1943) 318 U. S. 434, 63 S. Ct. 679, 87 L. Ed. 884, 144 A.L.R. 1189.
131n re Vordoman Shoe Co. (Dist. Ct., E.D. Mo. 1943) 52 F. Supp. 562.
14RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS 6173.
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would take nothing. 16 New Jersey was following the New York version
of the American rule, and therefore the assignments were valid as against
the trustee. The court points out in the next to the last paragraph of
its opinion that in the Corn Exchange Bank case emphasis is placed on
the intent of Congress to discourage secret transfers and not to strike
down the law protecting prior assignees in non-notification jurisdictions.
The opinion clearly indicates that the "standards" to be applied must
be found in the "applicable state law."
On June 13, 1947, the district court in New Jersey was again heard
from in In re Nizolek Furniture & Carpet Co., Inc.16 The court upheld
the assignment of accounts receivable against the claim of the trustee,
stating that the trustee to establish a preference under Section 60 would
have to prove a transfer:
1. To benefit the creditor particularly;
2. That it was for an antecedent debt;
3. That it was made by the assignor while insolvent;
4. Within four months of bankruptcy;
5. That its effect would be to give the assignee more than his share
of the assets; and
that in order to recover under Section 60, the trustee would have to prove
that the creditor receiving the preference had at the time of the transfer
reasonable cause to believe the debtor to be insolvent. Thus, an assignment
requiring no notice under state law was perfected when the loan was first
made, was then for ontemporaneous consideration rather than for an
antecedent debt, and the fact that a hypothetical subsequent bona fide
assignee could prevail by obtaining a judgment was not material for pur-
poses of "perfection" under Section 60.
In Adams v. City National Bank & Trust Co. of Macon,17 the court
emphasizing that a transfer must be "for or on account of an antecedent
debt," said,
"This refers to the whole transaction, and not simply to the step
to be taken to make it binding as to subsequent creditors and pur-
chasers for a valuable consideration."
Thus, we see the source of difficulty for the lending bank. Partly,
it lies in differing views as to "perfection" of the assignment, some courts
161n re Rosen (D. N.J. 1946) 66 F. Supp. 174.
1671 F. Supp. 1012.
17(1940) 115 F. (2) 453; Certiorari denied 312 U. S. 699.
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holding it perfected when the contract is made and so a loan for con-
temporaneous consideration at that time, others holding it perfected by
something done at a later date within four months of bankruptcy and
that it is then a transfer for an antecedent debt. But mainly, the diffi-
culty lies in the states pursuing the English rule calling for notification
of the debtor of the assignment in order to complete the transfer; also,
in states pursuing the Massachusetts rule, theoretically a second assignee
could gain a better right than a bank as first assignee if the debtor should
perchance in good faith make payment to the second assignee.
The New York version of the American rule seemingly gives ade-
quate protection to the lending bank. This is because of the ability of
the first assignee to recover from the second assignee any payments the
debtor may make to him. As will be recalled, the New York rule and
the Massachusetts rule are the two branches of the American rule that
first in time is first in right-no notification being necessary. However,
under the Chandler Act, unless notification is given by the bank of its
assignment, the security of an assignment of accounts receivable would
be safe only in those jurisdictions using the New York version of the
American rule.
III
THE MONTANA RULE
In General Electric Co. v. Black, 18 the plaintiff claimed under an
1894 assignment; the defendant answered a previous 1890 assignment
by its creditor and that the defendant had subsequently paid the first
assignee. Holding for the defendant, the court said:
"This plaintiff company which claims the account was assigned to
it iw 1894, long after its assignor had parted with its title to the
account, acquired no title therein by its alleged assignment."
This is an adoption of the American rule that the first assignment
controls, but whether the New York or Massachusetts version thereof is
Montana law is not clear from the Montana authority.
IV
REACTION OF STATES TO
INTERPRETATION OF SECTION SIXTY
It would seem that the Congress has gone too far in the language
of Section 60. While a major purpose was to strike at secret liens, the
18(1897) 19 Mont. 110, 47 P. 639.
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effect has been a high degree of uncertainty and confusion, and no doubt
considerable hesitation by lenders in making loans of undoubted validity.
To obviate these decisions invalidating the security, the states could
require actual delivery of the assigned accounts to the pledgee bank, but
this is not desired. The lending finance company may not have a col-
lection department. If it must go into the work of collecting on the
assigned accounts, it must 'increase the charges to the borrower. The
assignor will not wish his customers to know he is in a weak financial
condition. Perhaps, they could not rely on him to carry out their con-
tracts with him. The assignor's idea is that the less notorious the trans.
action the less chance of the borrower's competitors taking advantage of it.
Delivery is therefore impractical. Four types of statutes are, however,
being enacted in the states. They are:
1. Non-notification statutes (New York rule) making the assign.
ment valid at date of its creation with no notice of any kind
required. This is sometimes called a validating statute.
2. Recording or filing of the assignment.
3. Book-marking-marking the accounts receivable in the book.
keeping system of the borrower so that a subsequent assignee
or creditor would see that they had been assigned.
4. A combination allowing book-marking, filing or giving notice
to the debtor.
To avoid conflicting laws and to meet the demand for action to
protect the interest of the banks making loans on accounts receivable, a
majority of the Committee of the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws prepared a draft uniform law to be adopted
by the states. 19 A study of this proposed statute indicates that this law
is a suggested version of the New York rule. The property interest in
the assignment becomes fixed at the date of the assignment; no notice
of any kind is required; no recording is necessary; the debtor is protected
from being obliged to make double payments; and the prior assignee has
a superior claim to all subsequent assignees. In addition, the Commis-
sioners on Uniform State Laws gave five reasons for using the American
rule in the Uniform Act:
1. Recording destroys fluidity of credit;
2. No reason to record assignment of accounts receivable and not
bonds, notes, etc.;
19REPORT OF SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON UNIFORM ACT ON ASSIGN-
MENT OF ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLE, (1944) p. 1I (Exhibit I).
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3. Recording statutes are not acceptable to many states;
4. Right of privacy invaded unduly by requiring recording of
assignments; and
5. A greater likelihood of uniformity.20
A minority of the Committee drafted an alternative which allowed
filing of notice of assignments to be optiLaal. 2 1 This suggested law differed
from that of the majority of the Committee in that while recording was
not necessary; still, if an assignee did record, he immediately gained a
prior right.
Since the report of the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws in 1944, twenty-two states have enacted laws to
protect the interest of the assignee in accounts receivable. These laws
are not uniform, though many incorporate with variations the principles
of the Uniform Act. Probably most interesting is the adoption in 1945
of the New York rule by Massachusetts, which is indicative of the swing
away from the Massachusetts Act.22 This act is modeled after the pro-
posed Uniform Act.
An examination of the recent legislation will show that, while the
Uniform Act has had its effect, the effect has not been uniform. Some
of the legislation was passed prior to the proposed Uniform Act; and
also, even where it was apparent that the legislature was obviously im-
pressed with the Uniform Act, it has modified it in various respects.
As a sole remedial procedure, this will probably not be adequate.
It takes many years to obtain acquiescence of all jurisdictions in a uniform
law. For example, the Negotiable Instruments Law, which is the only
uniform law to be adopted in fifty-three jurisdictions of the United
States, was first promulgated in 1896.23 It was adopted by the last of
the fifty-three jurisdictions thirty-four years later in Puerto Rico.24
Of the other uniform acts, the Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act,
created in 1906, was adopted in fifty-one of the various jurisdictions by
1944, with South Carolina being the only state not adopting it;2 5 but,
2OREPORT OF SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON UNIFORM ACT ON ASSIGN-
MENT OF ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLE (1944) , p. 7.
21REPORT OF SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON UNIFORM ACT ON ASSIGN-
MENT OF ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLE (1944), p. 15 (Exhibit 2).
22Ch. 107o, &1-6 ANNOTATED LAWS OF MASS. (1946).
23HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSION ON
UNIFORM STATE LAWS AND PROCEEDINGS (1944), pp. 340-341..
245UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS, Part 1,
p. XIII, Table III.
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on the other hand, the Uniform Statute of Limitations Act of 1939 has
absolutely no adopters. 26
The reasons for the Uniform Accounts Receivable Act are that:
1. It would make the law uniform in all the states;
2. It would seem to be more in accord with the existing line of
thought for handling combined federal-state legal situations;
that is, the federal courts will follow the state law where it
exists.27 This would be applicable where bankruptcy law would
be applied, the assignment's completion being determined by
state law;
3. It would seem to be more in the province of the states to regu-
late assignments, and have the assignments so determined that
the law applying to them would not have one effect generally
and another effect when the bankruptcy law is applied;
4. Also, it would provide a base for common treatment of this and
other security devices by amendment of the National Bank-
ruptcy Act, since the present Bankruptcy Act makes question-
able conveyances under the Uniform Trust Receipts Act, the
Uniform Fiaudulent Conveyance Act, Conditional Sales for
Resale, Factoring Agreements, and Blanket Chattel Mortgages.
The Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act provides in part that every
conveyance by an insolvent without fair consideration is fraudulent and
that a creditor may have the conveyance set aside as to all but a bona
fide purchaser. 28 In other words, if the assignment has not by some
kind of notice or statute become fixed in the assignee, it can be set aside.
Again the Uniform Trust Receipts Act provides that a trust receipt
without filing is good against all creditors for thirty days after delivery
of the goods or the papers to the trustee, but a bona fide purchaser will
be protected. 2 9 Suppose the Bankruptcy Act of today is brought to bear
on such a situation. Theoretically, a bona fide purchaser could acquire
a right superior to the right of the security transferee, and so the thirty
day non-filing period could place the assignee in a very unfortunate
position as to a trust receipt.
2 6See note 23, supra.
2 6See note 23, supra,
2 7Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins (1938) 304 U. S. 64, 82 L. Ed. 1188, 58
S. Ct. 817.28Ch. 126, &&1-14, LAWS OF MONTANA 1945 (Uniform Fraudulent
Conveyance Act).29Ch. 147, 1-19, LAWS OF MONTANA 1945 (Uniform Trust Receipts
Act).
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V
SUGGESTED AMENDMENT TO THE BANKRUPTCY LAW
ADVOCATED BY THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION
Since uniform laws will probably not prove-an effective sole reme-
dial procedure, we turn to amendment of the bankruptcy statute. The
American Bar ssociation has advocated an amendment along the follow-
ing lines. 30 In its proposal, Paragraph I remains as in Section 60a of
the Chandler Act Amendment of 1938. Paragraph 2 is changed so that
the fixing of the interest in the assignment is to be determined by regard
for whether or not an ordinary lien creditor can later acquire a better
right than the pledgee, rather than by regarding this from the stand-
point of the bona fide purchaser. For the potential bona fide purchaser
test is to be substituted the potential creditor test.
Thus, we eliminate the criticism directed at the so-called "bona
fide purchaser" test--some writers saying that the effect of 60a was to
place the trustee in bankruptcy in the place of a bona fide purchaser,
which he obviously was not. It is to be noted that "property" and "real
property" are distinguished in this section. The effect of this is to
place the assignment of real property interests in another category to
be determined by the old bona fide purchaser rule. Moreover, the old
troublesome clause, "... and, if such transfer is not so perfected prior
to filing of the petition in bankrupcty .... it shall be deemed to have
been made immediately before bankruptcy," is left out. Paragraph 3
of the proposed act specifically sets forth that the assignment for good
consideration will be considered made at the time of transfer; thus, the
assignment is perfected and no subsequent creditor could acquire a su-
perior interest. This supports the New York rule that a prior assignee
has a better right than a second assignee, whether notice is given or not.
Paragraph 3 Part 1 also takes care of the present conflict raised by the
thirty-day non-filing period allowed by the Uniform Trust Receipts Act.
Under this Part 1, the transfer, if perfected in the thirty-day period, is
considered to have been perfected at the time of transfer.
Thus, this further amendment of the Bankruptcy Act seems to
be the more immediately feasible approach to eliminating the difficulty
raised by Section 60 of the Chandler Act. While it will not make the
perfection of accounts receivable uniform in all jurisdictions, it will
establish the perfection necessary to avoid the assignments being set aside
in case of bankruptcy, and the banks may govern themselves accordingly.
30H.R. 2412, 80TH CONGRESS, 1ST SESSION (1947),
10
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Questions may yet remain. Some have criticized the proposed
American Bar Association Amendment because it may go too far in
allowing the return of the secret equitable lien of the sort upheld in
Sexton v. Kessler.3 1 It ,has been proposed that there be inserted in Sub-
section 2 of the bill a proviso reading:
"For the purposes of this section, such a creditor shall be deemed
to have an interest superior to that of any equitable lienor. ' ' 3 2
A second criticism relates to that part which ties bankruptcy preferences
to state law, and the question is asked:
"'Is the constitutional mandate that Congress has power to pass
a uniform act on the subject of bankruptcy met when bankruptcy
preferences are tested by forty-eight varying and at times incon-
sistent laws?' And so it has been proposed that subsection 2 be
amended by adding at the end thereof the following proviso: 'pro-
vided, further, that for the purposes of this section, applicable law
shall be construed to mean the statutes of a state and the common
law of a state providing such common law accords with general
law'.",33
This would be a return to Swift v. Tyson in the preference section of the
Bankruptcy Act.
The matter is before Congress, and it is believed that a change
from the hypothetical bona fide purchaser rule to the hypothetical cred-
itor rule would prove beneficial in determining preferences in bankruptcy.
The better way undoubtedly would be to have a Uniform State
Law as to Assignments of Accounts Receivable, modeled on and com-
patible with the proposed amendment in bankruptcy. This would be
in line with the work being done by the Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws on a Uniform Commercial Code. It would simplify the
matter and avoid confusion between the two laws where state law may
apply to non-bankruptcy liquidation of a debtor up to a certain point
followed thereafter by liquidation in bankruptcy. It is also believed
that the result should be similar whether a debtor is liquidated under
non-bankruptcy state law or under the Federal Bankruptcy Act. Debtors
often have prpoerty in different jurisdictions and make assignments across
state lines; uniform operation of liquidation law is therefore highly de-
sirable.
Loran A. Johnson.
31(1912) 225 U. S. 90, 32 S. Ct. 657.
32Keefe, Kelly Jr., & Lewis, Sick Sixty, 33 CORNELL L.Q. 99 (1947).33See note 32, supra,
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